Literature Review

This chapter explores the possibility of extending Sen's and Nussbaum's capability approach to the question of ecological obligations to future generations. It is argued that we can extend capability protection to future generations, but this leaves open which resources such a theory is to leave to future generations. The chapter argues that the influential views of Rawls and Solow, which hold that these resources should be conceived in terms of ‘total capital’, cannot be accepted by a capability approach because of their assumption of substitutability between natural and human-made capital. It is proposed that a capability theory of justice best fits with a combination of two ecological approaches: the ecological space approach and Herman Daly's resource rules.

A motivation problem may arise when morally principled public policy calls for serious sacrifice, relative to ways of life and levels of well-being, on the part of the members of a free society. Apart from legal or other forms of “external” coercion, what will, could, or should move people to make the sacrifices required by morality? I explore the motivation problem in the context of morally principled public policy concerning our legacy for future generations. In this context the problem raises special moral-psychological difficulties. My inquiry suggests pessimism regarding our ability to solve the motivation problem relative to what morality requires on behalf of future generations.

Neither environmental economics nor environmental philosophy have adequately examined the moral implications of imposing environmental degradation and ecosystem instability upon our descendants. A neglected aspect of these problems is the supposed extent of the burden that the current generation is placing on future generations. The standard economic position on discounting implies an ethical judgment concerning future generations. If intergenerational obligations exist, then two types of intergenerational transfer must be considered: basic distributional transfers and compensatory transfers. Basic transfers have been the central intergenerational concern of both environmental economics and philosophy, but compensatory transfers emphasize obligations of a kind often disregarded.

Our behaviour and policies with regard to nature and the environment should be guided by a code of ethics, which is to be derived from basic principles and from a pragmatic consideration of the issues at stake. The man–nature relationship has always been ambiguous, nature being seen as both a provider and an enemy. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, man is set apart from nature and called to dominate it, although this attitude has been revised to become one of stewardship. Oriental religions, on the other hand, have a more holistic view and consider humans as an integral part of nature. Modern philosophers have views ranging from anthropocentrism to biocentrism and egocentrism. It is suggested to take a pragmatic approach by which primary human needs are met first and foremost whereas the needs of other living organisms and ecosystems are allowed to prevail over secondary human needs. A plea is made to support the Earth Charter, which embodies in its principles and prescriptions a balanced respect for nature and future human generations.

Today it is widely recognised that much of the harm done to the environment is not limited by geographical, political or time barriers. From the point of view of environmental ethics, our concern for future generations arises mainly from their position of disadvantage: preceding generations can limit the opportunities bequeathed to later generations by causing irreversible harm and depleting resources. This paper first introduces some historical references; the most significant problems posed by the rights of future generations in regard to the environment are then identified, the notions of common heritage and capital as referred to the environment are discussed and the relations between sustainable development and the rights of future generations are presented. Some social aspects, legal implications and the contributions of philosophers and experts on the question of intergenerational justice in environmental terms are then analysed. An attempt is finally made to define the most significant problems involved.

Democracy is prone to what may be called presentism – a bias in the laws in favor of present over future generations. I identify the characteristics of democracies that lead to presentism, and examine the reasons that make it a serious problem. Then I consider why conventional theories are not adequate to deal with it, and develop a more satisfactory alternative approach, which I call democratic trusteeship. Present generations can represent future generations by acting as trustees of the democratic process. The general principle is that present generations should act to protect the democratic process itself over time. They should try to make sure that future citizens continue to have competent control over their collective decision‐making.

Intergenerational ethics is the study of our responsibilities to future individuals—individuals (human or not) who are not now alive but will be. The term “future” characterizes, not the kind of a thing, but rather the temporal perspective from which it is being described. Future people, as such, therefore differ from us neither intrinsically nor in moral status. Our responsibilities to them are best understood by attempts to see things from their perspective, not from ours. Though intergenerational ethics takes various forms, the credible forms in conjunction with known facts yield two great practical conclusions: we must reduce human population, and we must keep most fossil fuels in the ground. The demandingness of these conclusions is no objection against them, but rather an accurate measure of the moral burdens of our godlike knowledge and power.

Although John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice does not deal specifically with the ethics of environmental concerns, it can generally be applied to give justification for the prudent and continent use of our natural resources. The argument takes two forms: one dealing with the immediate effects of environmental impact and the other, delayed effects. Immediate effects, which impact the present society, should be subject to environmental controls because they affect health and opportunity, social primary goods to be dispensed by society. Delayed environmental impacts, affecting future generations, are also subject to control because future generations have a just claim upon our natural resources-the generation to which a person belongs is an arbitrary contingency which should not exclude persons not yet born from consideration in the original contract of society.

Any attempt at thoroughly exploring issues of green constitutionalism requires a close look at the interactions between constitutions and our concern for justice towards future generations. It is crucial to understand at the outset that, far from a convergence, there is a fundamental tension at work between two types of concerns for future generations as they translate at the constitutional level. On the one hand, by incorporating substantive and/or procedural guarantees in the constitution, one may well aim at reinforcing the protection of the coming generations against actions of generations preceding them and deemed problematic. Yet, on the other hand, the more we rely on constitutions—as opposed to less rigid legal instruments—the more we threaten the generational sovereignty of future generations. Taking seriously the renewal in theories of justice as well as the development of environmentalism in the 1970s and 1980s, one may be tempted to assume that constitutions can only serve future generations. Yet, exactly two centuries earlier, in the late 1780s and early 1790s, the concern of authors such as Jefferson (1789) and Paine (1791) was just the opposite. Constitutions can thus constitute double-edged swords from the perspective of intergenerational justice. The tools used in a constitution to offer even stronger guarantees to the rights of future people simultaneously restrict the sovereignty of coming generations. Constitutionalization is thus not straightforwardly compatible with the demands of intergenerational justice.

This chapter examines whether Rawls’ theory provides an argumentative basis for the rights of future generations. First, we ask what are the rational devices to conceive of justice between generations within the realm of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, and we explore whether the systematic foundation of these devices is convincing. Specifically, we investigate Rawls’ attempt to derive the notion of rights out of a conception of reciprocal arrangements to enhance the individuals’ self-interests. Second, the chapter portrays important modifications in Rawls’ advocacy for sustainability in his later works, pointing out difficulties in harmonizing Rawls’ antifoundational theoretical make-up in Political Liberalism with the notion of intertemporal justice. Third, as it becomes evident that Rawls’ theory cannot provide a satisfactory foundation for the rights of future generations, we investigate how to establish the unconditional as well as asymmetrical obligations that correspond to such rights.

In Morals by Agreement David Gauthier proposes four criteria for classifying a society's advancement toward ‘higher stages of human development.' Significantly, these criteria — material well-being, breadth of opportunity, average life-span, and density of population — do not include as an equally valuable achievement the society's capacity to sustain its standard of living (288). Nonetheless Gauthier presents three arguments intended to show that a community founded on his distributive theory will view depletionary resource policies as unreasonable and unacceptable. I shall contend that these arguments do not succeed in motivating sustainable rates of resource exploitation. Furthermore, I argue that if truly just and rational resource use policies can be arrived at, such policies could only succeed by employing a conception of property rights substantially different from Gauthier's.

This article focuses on some very fundamental threats to future generations' leaving, and considers whether most essential interests of future persons not to be harmed can be construed as rights, and in particular as human rights, as much as present persons'. The framework refers essentially to a conceptual grammar of justice. Moreover, it is suggested to articulate rights through the lens of disposability and non-disposability principles. Finally, the article shows the reasons for separating what we owe to future persons under the challenge of those threats for humanity, i.e. a matter of justice, from our right to hand down our cultural heritage, and eventually from paternalistic imposition upon future generations of our irreversible choices (even eu-genetic pre-design of future persons identity).