Literature Review

In recent years, conservation planning, policy, and communications have increasingly emphasized the human benefits, or “ecosystem services,” provided by nonhuman nature. In response to this utilitarian, anthropocentric framing, some conservationists have countered that nonhuman nature is valuable for more than its instrumental use to humans. In other words, these critics maintain that nonhuman nature has intrinsic value, which the ecosystem services paradigm fails to duly acknowledge. Proponents of the ecosystem services approach have responded in turn, either by proposing that intrinsic value can be integrated into the ecosystem services framework, or by justifying the pull away from intrinsic value on the grounds that it does not motivate broad support for conservation. We suggest these debates have been clouded by an ambiguous conceptualization of intrinsic value, which in fact has a rich intellectual heritage in philosophy and environmental ethics. We therefore review some of the major work from these literatures, to provide members of the conservation community with a deeper understanding of intrinsic value that, we hope, will inform more focused and productive discourse. Following this review, we highlight two common ways intrinsic value has been misinterpreted in recent debates around ecosystem services. As a result of these misinterpretations, we argue, the non-anthropocentric ethical concerns raised by many critics of the ecosystem services approach remain effectively unaddressed. We conclude by offering logical, practical, and moral reasons why the concept of intrinsic value continues to be relevant to conservationists, even and especially in the emerging ecosystem services paradigm.

Integrating ecology and economics is increasingly important as humanity's impact on the natural world increases. Current paradigms in both fields are too narrow (and seem to be getting narrower). This paper introduces and summarizes this special issue of Ecological Modeling devoted to ecological economics. There are eleven papers (including this one) that cover most of the importan theoretical issues involved (applied papers are left for a future volume). These issues are: (1) sustainability; (2) inter- and intra-species distribution of wealth; (3) discounting and intergenerational justice; and (4) dealing with non-monetized values, imprecision, and uncertainty. This collection is seen as a hopeful first step toward a true synthesis of ecology and economics that could lead to better management of renewable and non-renewable natural resources and a sustainable future.

This article argues that the declaration of principles for a global warming convention should include a reference to the rights of future generations to a livable planet. While such a declaration may not result in the creation of actual legal powers, such a declaration is important simply because rights for future generations are not the current expectation, or norm. Regime theory maintains that regimes for international cooperation are formed by the convergent expectations of the regime's members and by behavioral regularities regarding those expectations. Developing a regime for international cooperation on global warming that is cognizant of the rights of future generations may require evidence of potential impact on future generations. Development of knowledge-based (epistemic) communities at the domestic and international levels regarding that impact may, by promoting convergent expectations and behavioral regularities, help to establish norms for present generations.

International institutions that purport to represent future generations have the potential to act as powerful vehicles for promoting sustainability. The normative basis for this approach rests on an assumption that international institutions ought to promote justice – including intergenerational justice. The massive bias against future generations in contemporary rule-making and institutions justifies international institutions with a mandate to represent future generations as a means for redressing this imbalance. The democratic ideal also justifies such institutions which can provide a voice for future generations that are inevitably impacted by contemporary decision-making. These normative arguments are explored in relation to a proposed UN Commissioner for future generations. This case study addresses the question of how a mandate for such an institution should best be framed – in terms of human rights or sustainability, and also the democratic legitimacy of such institutions. The chapter concludes with some proposals for further research.

This paper critically evaluates the notion and application of economic, monetary valuation of biological diversity, or biodiversity. For this purpose four levels of diversity are considered: genes, species, ecosystems and functions. Different perspectives on biodiversity value can be characterized through a number of factors: instrumental vs. intrinsic values, local vs. global diversity, life diversity vs. biological resources, etc. A classification of biodiversity values is offered, based on a system of logical relationships among biodiversity, ecosystems, species and human welfare. Suggestions are made about which economic valuation methods can address which type of biodiversity value. The resulting framework is the starting point for a survey and evaluation of empirical studies at each of the four levels of diversity. The contingent valuation method is by far the most used method. An important reason is that the other valuation methods are unable to identify and measure passive or nonuse values of biodiversity. At first sight, the resulting monetary value estimates seem to give unequivocal support to the belief that biodiversity has a significant, positive social value. Nevertheless, most studies lack a uniform, clear perspective on biodiversity as a distinct concept from biological resources. In fact, the empirical literature fails to apply economic valuation to the entire range of biodiversity benefits. Therefore, available economic valuation estimates should generally be regarded as providing a very incomplete perspective on, and at best lower bounds, to the unknown value of biodiversity changes.

Possible environmental and related impacts of human activity are shown to include the extinction of humanity and other sentient species, excessive human numbers, and a deteriorating quality of life (I). I proceed to argue that neither future rights, nor Kantian respect for future people's autonomy, nor a contract between the generations supplies a plausible basis of obligations with regard to future generations. Obligations concern rather promoting the well-being of the members of future generations, whoever they may be, as well as of current generations. Future benefits and costs should only be discounted where there are special reasons for doing do so (e.g. relevant opportunity costs) (II). A sustainable economy is held to be necessary for intergenerational equity. This granted, principles of equity are introduced concerning: compensation for long-term risks and for resource depletion; conserving the stock of resources, resource diversity, and assimilative capacity; equal options and opportunities for each generation; and remedying past failures to conserve environmental quality. Rules and policies considered include: an efficient, diversified, and ecologically sustainable economy; no increase of risk of irreversible environmental change; and action despite uncertainty to avert serious future outcomes (the Precautionary Principle). These policies are argued to require rectification of current injustices within and between current generations (III). Finally, the recently resuscitated metaphysical model of society as a partnership between generations is held to imply the view of each generation as trustees rather than owners of the planet. This trusteeship view is independently credible, and supportive of the principles and policies earlier introduced; and its adoption by successive generations could turn the partnership model into a reality (IV).

This article compliments one by Doorn entitled “Do ecosystems have ethical rights?” in which she recounts the history of philosophical and ethical thought concerning the value of ecosystems. She notes that anthropocentrists do not acknowledge the intrinsic value of nature. Here, we argue that changing our perspective of what leads to human well-being is more important than valuing ecosystems based solely on their monetary worth to people. We encourage a form of environmental pragmatism that reflects pluralism in how nature is valued.

This article analyzes the doctrinal findings of the Hungarian Constitutional Court with respect to the constitutional protection afforded to future generations in the Fundamental Law. It focuses on Decision No. 14/2020. (VII. 6.) AB in which the Constitutional Court abolished an amendment to the Forest Act for infringing the right to a healthy environment and the environmental interests of future generations as enshrined in Article P of the Fundamental Law. On this occasion, the Constitutional Court for the first time explicitly recognized that Article P embodies the public trust doctrine; and stressed that it confers fiduciary duties on the State to act as a trustee over the natural heritage of the nation for the benefit of future generations, which limits the executive’s discretion to exploit and regulate such resources. This article puts the Hungarian constitutional public trust in a comparative perspective by exploring the origins, role and functioning of similar constitutional public trust provisions in other jurisdictions. This is followed by setting out the normative principles derived by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in its previous practice from Article P, such as the non-derogation principle, the principle of inter-generational equity, the imperative of long-term planning, economical use of resources and the precautionary principle. The article then sets out the legal bases featured in the ex post constitutional challenge brought against the amendment of the Forest Act by the Ombudsman, and the Constitutional Court’s reasoning. It concludes with offering some wider lessons for the judicial enforcement of long-term environmental goals vis-á-vis short-term economic private interests.

Given that modern democracies face generation-transcending policy challenges, this study asks whether the interests of future generations are sufficiently taken into account in present-day parliamentary politics. Through analysis of parliamentary documents in Belgium (2010–2019), we examine whether present-day MPs make representative claims on behalf of future generations, how such claims are made and by whom. We find that MPs do formulate claims, but only to a limited extent and with little or no justification. Moreover, claims-making is driven by electoral-strategic considerations. Only those who hold prominent positions make claims for future generations and fewer claims are made in election years.

This Note posits that future generations, born and unborn, are entitled to constitutional protection from climate change. Accordingly, this Note seeks to establish that the right to a healthy environment is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, thus, invoking the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requiring the federal government to protect future generations and combat the effects of climate change. One cannot address climate change without recognizing the responsibility owed to future generations, as future generations will inevitably be affected by climate change. To ensure the survival of future generations, present generations must be proactive in securing constitutional rights for them. Failing to do so could result in the deprivation of many basic rights, such as access to clean air, water, shelter, or food for future generations.

Global existential and catastrophic risks, particularly those arising from technological developments, present challenges for intergenerational justice. We aim to present a solutions-based approach to the challenge of intergenerational inequality. We examine options for representing future generations in our present policymaking structures, drawing on case studies from Singapore, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Scotland and Wales. We derive several factors which contribute to the success of some of these institutions, and discuss reasons for the failure or abolition of others. We draw out broad lessons which we can apply to policymaking in England, and make policy recommendations based on these findings.

Sustainable Development means 'meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'. It is a very complex and broad based concept that incorporates following principles, which are directly or indirectly applicable to developmental activities: (a) economic sustainability, (b) ecological sustainability, (c) social sustainability and (d) cultural sustainability. The sustainable development has both intra-generational and inter-generational equities and several approaches. It has some important measures too that will be discussed here.