Literature Review

Anthropocentric mode of consciousness has disturbed the internal cohesion and inter-relatedness of the natural world and is leading the world towards environmental devastation. Climate change is one of the biggest threats to humanity and is the face of this crisis. In view of this, the paper argues that we should make a shift towards ecocentric ways of thinking which look at nature in holistic terms and recognise the intrinsic value and rights of all the constituents of nature—rivers, mountains, plants and animals including human beings. Human existence is possible only when different constituents of nature interact with each other in a positive way. The paper argues that ecocentric awareness should be embedded in human governance system, law, education, culture and ethics, to save the world from environmental devastation.

As the world fights climate change and the exploitation of nature, countries like Ecuador and New Zealand have taken some significant steps in bringing laws into the natural world.

Diplomats from countries around the world gathered in Stocholm to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment—the meeting that made the environment a prominent international issue.

The fields of animal law and environmental law have an uneasy relationship. At a basic level, they are intertwined by the fundamental observation that animals, human and nonhuman, exist in the environment. Environmental law is generally concerned with animals at the level of species (and specifically endangered or threatened species), whereas animal law is concerned with all animals, regardless of particular characteristics. The issue of wild horses in the western United States illustrates this tension. Some environmentalists view the horses as “feral pests” that damage the fragile ecosystem and compete with wildlife — and privately owned cattle — for resources.

The circumstances surrounding the PACT Act — the efforts to obtain it, the celebration of it, and its effects — represent a microcosm of animal-law efforts in the realm of carceral animal law more generally. It is a high-profile palliative intervention that provides a sense of accomplishment without addressing any of the underlying causes of animal suffering. Politicians and advocates celebrate the efforts as landmark victories, but in fact, as this Essay argues, the efforts tend to do more harm than good by reinforcing, and even exaggerating, the invisibility of most animal suffering in law.

The justice system simply does not — or cannot — give cases of animal cruelty the time and attention they deserve. Animals are sentient beings; they experience pain and suffering. Every state in the nation criminalizes cruelty against them. Animal cruelty is also a warning sign of cruelty against human beings. Those who are cruel to animals are over five times as likely to commit cruelty against humans; one study found that sixty-five percent of those arrested for cruelty to animals had also been charged with other offenses; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation tracks acts of animal cruelty because of the distinct risks of such abusers. But because animals lack voices to communicate their suffering to us, crimes against them often fall through cracks in the justice system.

The Lancet, the world’s oldest and one of the field’s most established medical — not environmental — journals has published an advocacy column in favor of granting “rights” to “nature.”

In his article, Guzmán explains how the inclusion of rights of nature protections in the Ecuadorian constitution represents the decolonization of human rights to include indigenous narratives. He grounds his argumentation in historical narratives of colonialism and anthropological theory, demonstrating the need to legislate beyond Western paradigms that excuse human-perpetuated environmental degradation in favor of economic growth. By recognizing nature as an autonomous entity with rights, indigenous peoples may begin to reclaim justice as society makes the necessary and long overdue shift toward non-anthropocentric environmental law.

This article discusses the Trans Mountain pipeline in Canada and the Salish Sea, contextualizing them within the controversy surrounding fossil fuel pipelines as both environmentally harmful and potentially economically beneficial. Previously, lawsuits initiated by indigeneous tribes to combat pipeline projects attempted to hold fossil fuel companies accountable for contributions to climate change and environmental degradation. One approach to fight the construction of the Trans Mountain pipeline is to try and establish rights for and advocate on behalf of the Salish Sea, a significant ecosystem comprising mammals, fish, birds, and invertebrates that inhabit the waters, as well as the several million people that live in the sea’s vicinity. Chapman discusses the emerging rights of nature movement, shifting the concept of nature from property to a legal entity with its own right to exist and flourish. The ability to initiate litigation on behalf of the Salish Sea would be more effective and provoke more immediate action than long-term policy work that forces policymakers to choose between protecting the environment and advancing the economy.

McDonough argues in her paper that current litigation frameworks are inherently anthropocentric and therefore do not allow for full scale environmental protection. She details the legal history of rights of nature in the US, commenting on efforts by the State of Colorado to grant the Colorado River personhood and Grant Township, Pennsylvania’s introduction of their Community Bill of Rights. McDonough also discusses the implications of voters’ decision in Toledo, Ohio to grant rights to Lake Erie rights, a movement which was legally challenged by stakeholders including farmers who argued that their operations would potentially be compromised by the law. This example and others from countries outside of the United States illustrate some of the practical difficulties that can arise when rights of nature protections come into conflict with economic activity.

In his Master’s thesis, Daniel Adel draws upon research from fields within environmental justice, southern environmentalism, ecological nationalism, and environmental governance in order to examine social movements and civil society activism seeking the protection of the rivers of Bangladesh. Through interviews with river activists and relevant organizations along with field research data analysis, Adel addresses the following question: how are civil society organizations analyzing and responding to the water diversions and degradation of Bangladesh’s transboundary rivers? Adel finds that the primary response involves the advocacy of a common water-sharing framework that respects ecological and watershed boundaries in South Asia and calls for the restoration of a river’s natural course through the abolishment of existing dams and other diversionary structures. This integrated approach to water resource management endeavors to advance water diplomacy and bioregional notions of river governance with the goal of actualizing true “watershed democracy” throughout South Asia as a whole.

Bilof discusses how the injury-in-fact standard has become a hurdle in establishing standing for environmental litigation attempting to bring legal action to protect the environment, specifically regarding human practices polluting waterways. Bilof analyzes two lawsuits aiming at protecting the Suwannee and Colorado Rivers. The Sierra Club as a plaintiff may not have standing alone and citizens in environmental litigation must allege injury-in-fact by proving they are persons “‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity.” In the Colorado River lawsuit, referring to the river as an ecosystem proved to be more legally feasible and expansive, and the plaintiffs posed as guardians. Acting as guardians or “next friends” proposes a less restrictive standing standard because they no longer have to prove a direct human harm, which is where environmental litigation has failed in the past. Bilof concludes that it is unfortunate ecosystem personhood has yet to be tried in an American court, but that attaining personhood for environmental systems (rather than individual entities) opens the door for the possibility of greater environmental protections, and widens the scope of environmental harm injuries courts could contemplate.