Literature Review

The culling of animals that are infected, or suspected to be infected, with COVID-19 has fuelled outcry. What might have contributed to the ongoing debates and discussions about animal rights protection amid global health crises is the lack of a unified understanding and internationally agreed-upon definition of “One Health”. The term One Health is often utilised to describe the imperative to protect the health of humans, animals, and plants, along with the overarching ecosystem in an increasingly connected and globalized world. However, to date, there is a dearth of research on how to balance public health decisions that could impact all key stakeholders under the umbrella of One Health, particularly in contexts where human suffering has been immense. To shed light on the issue, this paper discusses whether One Health means “human-centred connected health” in a largely human-dominated planet, particularly amid crises like COVID-19. The insights of this study could help policymakers make more informed decisions that could effectively and efficiently protect human health while balancing the health and well-being of the rest of the inhabitants of our shared planet Earth.

This judgment is set in 2060, in an Australia that has been scarred and changed by decades of devastating climate change impacts, including drought, famine, and disease. A new legal system has been created – one which is led and shaped by the First Peoples of the continent and characterised by the Relationist Ethos and bioregional governance and law. The judgment demonstrates what decision-making could look like within this context, where the onus of proof is reversed for commercial developments. Instead of today's pro-development State planning laws, which see local people having to fight for a voice in the decision-making processes, proponents of commercial proposals must prove to Indigenous Elders and local Peoples that they comply with the Relationist Ethos, and are of benefit to Country and people.

Everyday millions of nonhumans and thousands of humans endure solitary confinement. Captive animals held in solitary confinement similarly spend much of their lives locked into tiny spaces, isolated, and deprived of the types of interactions and environment essential to their wellbeing. Human prisoners are confined for twenty-two to twenty-four hours a day for weeks, months, or even years on end in cells the size of a parking space. In human and nonhuman settings, the agony of solitary is chillingly alike and harmful. And, in neither setting is it justifiable or necessary. This Article examines the moral, penological and scientific shortcomings of solitary confinement across species. Part I describes how solitary confinement is used in human and nonhuman settings and shows the deep wounds that it inflicts in both. Part II examines why the legal structures under which solitary confinement is imposed (on humans and nonhumans) offer inadequate protections from its depredations. Part III argues that incarcerated beings have no legal protections because they are powerless and invisible. In Part IV, the author with expertise in prison law (Mushlin) describes how solitary confinement would end in penal facilities if prisoners were empowered and their rights protected. Next, the author with expertise in animal law (Cassuto) explains why solitary confinement for animals in zoos, aquariums and laboratories should and could be abolished. The authors conclude with a call to empower creatures subjected to solitary confinement. If all vulnerable beings are adequately protected, the unnecessary suffering inflicted by solitary confinement can finally end.

In the context of India, a country with a rich tapestry of cultural, religious, and philosophical traditions that advocate for non-violence and compassion towards all living beings, the discourse on human rights versus animal rights takes on unique dimensions. This abstract explores the dichotomy between human rights and animal rights in the Indian context, drawing upon landmark judgments and constitutional provisions.India’s Constitution provides for fundamental human rights, including freedom of religion, speech, and movement within and outside the country. However, the discourse on animal rights is gaining momentum. The Indian Constitution and various legislations such as the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act of 1960 and the Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 provide for the protection of animals.Despite these provisions, animals in India are often subjected to cruelty and exploitation. This raises questions about the universality of rights and the need for a global declaration on animal rights. The Animal Welfare Board of India v. Nagaraja and Others case in 2014 was a landmark judgment where the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that animals also possess honour and dignity. Also, in the of N.R. Nair v. Union of India ; The Kerala High Court, shattered the walls between humans and non-humans and considered granting fundamental rights to animals as well and highlighted that legal rights should be extended beyond people and should not remain in the exclusive domain of human beings.This abstract argues that recognizing animal rights at a universal level would not only serve animals better but also complement human rights. It suggests that an international body like the United Nations or World Health Organization should work towards a universal declaration on animal rights.The denial of animal rights often reflects in the disregard for human rights. Therefore, acknowledging animal rights could potentially reinforce respect for human rights. The international legal order is flexible enough to accommodate non-human personhood, as demonstrated by the evolution of human rights.The abstract concludes by emphasizing that animal rights should be universalized to be effective in a globalized setting. It draws parallels with the historical experience with international human rights to show how objections like cultural imperialism can be overcome.

The fate of animals under human control has become a challenge of our time. One of the key dimensions of the ‘animal turn’ we are witnessing is the concept of ‘animal welfare.’ Unlike animal rights or abolitionist doctrines, animal welfare has gained some form of universal recognition. But it has different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. As practised in the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), ‘animal welfare’ is substantially deprived of any ethical foundation and is rather an economic- and efficiency-driven concept that legitimizes the industrial exploitation of animals. In the same vein, the recognition of ‘animal welfare’ as a universal issue by WTO dispute settlement institutions in the Seals dispute should not overshadow its anthropocentric dimension in a way that augments the suspicion that ‘animal welfare’ is a vehicle of cultural imperialism.

This invited commentary offers a reflection on Steelman’s proposal that the concept of occupational justice applies equally to non-human animals as to humans. As an author of the concept of occupational justice, I welcome the insights offered on justice and rights. It resonates with the work of other champions of animal rights, and is a timely addition to Kiepek’s recent article, Occupation in the anthropocene and ethical relationality, published in the Canadian Journal of Occupational Therapy.

COVID-19 and the prospect of a sixth mass extinction, among other crises, have underscored the urgency of recognizing humans' ethical and ecological entanglements with the more-than-human world. In light of these entanglements, this article brings together theories of occupational justice with those of animal rights in order to stimulate further discussion toward the development of a multispecies theory of occupational justice. First, a precedent and basis for nonhuman occupational rights is established in Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. Second, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s political theory of animal rights is invoked as a lens through which to understand how various types of nonhuman animals are differentially at risk for experiencing four occupational injustices: occupational deprivation, alienation, displacement, and apartheid. The article concludes that a commitment to multispecies occupational justice changes how science is practiced. Implications for occupational science and adjacent design sciences are explored, as well as directions for future research and political work.

COVID-19 con brio identified the intersectionality between humans and animals. This confirmed interlinkage between human and animal health and welfare led to the emergence of the ‘One Health’, casu quo, ‘One Welfare’ discourse. Regarding the current momentum of animal-human integration and following the footsteps of these movements, the time has come to consider a ‘One Right’ approach to address legal rights for (nonhuman) animals in Europe. This chapter will zoom in on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The focal point is whether or not animals have rights under this Article 8. In order to answer this highly topical question, it is vital to first demarcate what animal rights might entail. In the concluding part, a concise overview of the analysis of Article 8 of the ECHR will be presented, in tandem with a brief exploration into future prospects.

The burgeoning movement advocating legal personhood for animals is gaining momentum, aiming to elevate animals from mere property to beings with protective rights. Legal personhood, a concept that has evolved over time, has been granted to various entities, including corporations, ships, estates, idols, and institutions. Globally, non-human entities, such as animals, rivers, and forests, have been recognized as legal persons, enabling them to engage in legal actions through human representatives as spokespersons. In this context, some studies emphasize that science-backed judgments and legislation offer a solid foundation and are more practical to formulate and implement. This interdisciplinary approach to legal personhood for animals is crucial for reshaping animal rights in India

Growing scientific evidence shows that vast numbers of nonhuman animals are sentient, and ethicists have argued that this means they have moral value. However, law’s integration of individual animals as subjects with greater protection has been slow, despite the extreme threats that animals face today from human sources like climate change and industrial exploitation. Personhood has been heralded by some as a new legal status to protect animals, but the concept of “legal personhood” has been misunderstood. Most recently, New York’s highest court decided in a case of first impression that an elephant named Happy is not a legal person and does not have a right to liberty—over two impassioned dissents. This Article offers a new synthesis of views regarding the moral status of animals, their “basic rights,” and the relationship between basic rights and legal personhood. I argue that sentient animals have moral status that requires recognition of basic rights based on considerations of justice, which may lead to legal personhood over the long term. First, I argue that at least sentient animals have moral status and are subjects of justice who require greater legal protections. Then, I assess a new “bundle theory” of legal personhood that shows that personhood is a cluster concept composed of multiple “incidents.” I argue that American law should better recognize basic rights to bodily integrity, liberty, and probably life for sentient animals, and should correct a mistaken view that personhood is the simple ability to hold rights. However, basic rights are only one incident of legal personhood, although recognizing them may help lead to animal personhood in time. To inform litigation, I also show how the bundle theory helps to explain the important disagreement between the judges in Happy’s case. Finally, I suggest that both legislatures and judges can work to enhance animal legal rights, and perhaps eventually legal personhood, in the United States.

This book addresses one of today’s most urgent issues: the loss of wildlife and habitat, which together constitute an ecological crisis. Combining studies from different disciplines such as law, political science and criminology, with a focus on animal rights, the chapters explore the successes and failures of the international wildlife conservation and trade treaties, CITES and the BERN Convention. While these conventions have played a crucial role in protecting endangered species from trade and in the rewilding of European large carnivores, the case studies in this book demonstrate huge variations in their implementation and enforcement across Europe. In conclusion, the book advocates for a non-anthropocentric policy approach to strengthen wildlife conservation in Europe.

Studies show that the number of illegal wolf theriocides in Poland is significant and increasing. According to research, between 2002 and 2020 there were 91 cases of killings. On the other hand, between 1922 and 2022 we were able to identify only nine rulings related to the wolf crimes. It should be noticed that this situation is not justified by the official state approach to killing wolves in Poland. These animals have been a strictly protected species ever since 1998 and since then there has been no issuing of state licences for general population reduction. The chapter focuses on the social and legal factors influencing the effectiveness of combating the illegal killing of wolves in Poland. Our main argument is that these factors are, at the same time, the greatest problems for law enforcement authorities to effectively counteract the illegal wolf theriocides, especially when it comes to not only anthropogenic but also financial approaches in criminal law.